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Abstract 
 
A review of recent contributions to the explorations of the relations between economic 
inequality and corruption demonstrates that corruption as a factor of inequality has been 
poorly theoretically explained, although some empirical evidence has been tracked down. 
More convincing theoretical explanations have been offered regarding inequality as one of 
the factors of corruption. A theoretical model in which economic inequality is one of the 
factors (explanatory variables) of judicial corruption is formulated. Some consequences of 
this kind of corruption, practically the effects to economic inequality are analyzed. Finally, 
some policies to combat judicial corruption are been suggested. 
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 I  Introduction 
 
Economic research into the relations between economic inequality and corruption is rather 
young discipline; it has begun rather recently, with most of the relevant contributions 
published in the last five years. There are two basic approaches to these relations. The first 
approach is focused to the consequences of corruption in terms of its effects to the change of 
economic inequality and the second approach explores economic inequality as one of the 
factor of corruption, usually also taking into account a reverse causation, i.e. that increased 
corruption due to the economic inequality can produce additional inequality. The aim of this 
paper is to briefly review recent theoretical and empirical contributions to the explorations of 
the relations between economic inequality and corruption and to provide for a theoretical 
model of judicial corruption in which economic inequality is one of the factors (explanatory 
variables) of judicial corruption. Some consequences of judicial corruption will be analyzed. 
Finally, some of the feasible policies to combat judicial corruption will also be considered.  
 
In this paper corruption is, following Tanzi (1995), considered as violation of the arms-length 
principle to economic decisions. The paper is focused to the administrative corruption, i.e. 
violation of the arms-length principle in the process of enforcement of laws, rules and 
regulations, leaving out of consideration corruptive influence to formulation (content) of the 
public policies, i.e. laws, rules and regulations (“state capture”). Furthermore, it is assumed 
that economic inequality associated with political inequality, i.e. inequality of influence, 
though the causality can be both ways; hence hereafter only the term inequality instead of 
economic inequality will be used.     
 
II Inequality as a Consequence of Corruption  
 
Probably the first contribution on the relations between inequality and corruption (Johnson, 
1989) is focused to the effects of corruption to income inequality, claiming that corruption 
tends to preserve or even widen inequalities in the distribution of income.  
 
One of the seminal contribution on the effects of corruption to income inequality 
(distribution) Li et al. (2000) whose model of these effects is well founded in the three 
sectors rent-seeking model developed by Murphy et al. (1993). Consistent interpretation of 
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the three sector model provided a ground for both high and low inequality equilibrium. With 
very low and very high level of corruption, inequality is low (Gini is zero, according to the 
model), and with intermediate level of corruption, inequality is high. Thus the hypothesis is 
the corruption affects inequality in an inverted U-shape way (similar to the Kuznetz curve). 
Nonetheless, econometric testing of the hypothesis provided no evidence for that: in majority 
of the applied methods of estimation and model specifications, estimates of parameters of 
quadratic transformation of the corruption indicator were not statistically significant.2   
 
Gupta et al. (2002) provided some theoretical finding of the causality from corruption to 
inequality and provided some empirical results on that relation. A few mechanisms of 
influence of corruption to increased inequality have been identified. According to the authors, 
the first one is biased tax system as corruption can lead to tax evasion, defective tax 
administration and exemptions that favor the wealthy (and well connected) – this can reduce 
effective tax base and undermines possibilities for compulsory income/wealth redistribution 
from rich to poor, leading to the preservation or even increase of the inequality. Nonetheless, 
the same mechanism decreases effective tax burden and that can have beneficial effects to 
growth, not necessary decreasing inequality, but increasing the prospects for the 
improvement of the welfare of the poor. It is also disputable that tax exemptions and evasion 
is only in favor of the rich and well connected, i.e. it is not demonstrated that relative 
effective tax burden due to corruption is necessarily in favor of the rich, particularly not in 
the case of defective tax administration.3 Even if this mechanism of causality from corruption 
to inequality proves to be relevant, its effect heavily depends on the structure of the public 
expenditures. If the bulk of them are focused to the provision of the public good, rather than 
redistribution, than the effects will not be significant.       
 
The second mechanism is poor effective targeting of the social programs to the truly needed 
due to the corruption that is siphoning the funds from poverty alleviation programs from the 
poor to the powerful/reach individuals. It is dubious to what extent poor effective targeting of 
                                                 
2 The problem with inverted U-curve hypothesis can probably be traced down in two features of the three sector 
model formulated by Murphy et al. (1993). The first one is assumption that there is no inequality within the 
sector, and the second feature is assumption that rent-seeking exhibits general equilibrium increasing returns, an 
assumption that crucially depends on relative returns of productive and rent seeking activities: both functions 
seems not to be monotonic.   
3 Gyimah-Brempong (2002) focused the analysis to African countries claiming that the crucial distributional 
effect of corruption is via making effective taxation regressive. The claim is based on the finding of the 
theoretical model of Hendriks et al. (1999) that considered incentives to both tax payers and tax officials in the 
case of normative progressive taxation.  
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the social programs due to corruption really is contributing to increasing inequality. It is 
rather unrealistic to assume that the rich will be engaged in deliberate undermining social 
programs targeting via corruption as to siphoning rather limited funds. The point is that 
resources invested in corruption generate much higher returns in other activities comparing 
with targeting of social programs. Finally, poor targeting results in decreasing efficiency of 
the redistributive policies, i.e. inefficient deceasing of inequality, rather than increasing it.4   
 
The third mechanism identified by Gupta et al. (2002) is the one linked to the formation of 
human capital, i.e. education. As it has been already pointed out corruption decreases public 
revenues, hence all effective public expenditures, including education expenditures are 
scaled-down. Furthermore, it was demonstrated (Mauro, 1998, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998 and 
Gupta et al. 2001) that corruption has detrimental effects to the structure of the public 
expenditures in such a way that share of education is substantially decreased. Lowering 
provision of public education has detrimental effects on the ability of the poor to invest in 
their human capital and that can influence lower returns to the human capital of the poor 
comparing with the rich who have invested in their human capital from non-public sources, 
hence increasing economic inequality.  
 
Finally, according to Gupta et al. (2002) corruption increases uncertainty and risk for poor 
and not so well connected as it is reasonable to assume that the rules of the game are 
disturbed by corruption in favor of well off and well connected, hence the increase of risk 
premium is not equally distributed across the population. The risk premium is higher for the 
poor, and lack of their investment is creating more inequality. This is obviously “state 
capture” argument, rather than administrative corruption. It is not clear how rules of the game 
(being distorted or not) increase uncertainty and risk – high risk is due to biased enforcement 
of the rules, not the rules themselves. The other point is that a part of the rules of the game 
can be barriers to entry created by the rich to preserve rents. But that it has got nothing to do 
with the risk premium but, but with lack of new entries.5    
 
                                                 
4 Olken (2006) estimated that 18% of the rice that is distributed to the poor in Indonesia as a component of the 
wealth redistribution program disappears due to the corruption of the civil servants involved in the redistribution 
program.  
5 Although the notion of “state capture” as it has been specified by Hellmann and Kaufmann (2001) is that it is 
based on illicit influence, one (following Stigler, 1971 and Becker, 1983) can see no reason why “state capture” 
cannot be establish by legitimate influence. If that is the case, this not the mechanism that links corruption and 
inequality.    
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There is obviously a problem of the theory behind causality from corruption to inequality – it 
is not convincing. In addition to the already noticed problems, there is the other one. The 
crucial question is whether the rich and the poor face the same kind of corruption. It is 
reasonably to assume that these two groups are dealing with completely different segments of 
public administration and provision of public services. The rich faces big corruption, 
extortion regarding various business operations licenses and poor are facing rather small 
corruption, mainly in provision of public services. The crucial issue is the incidence of 
corruption taxation of the rich is rather complicated – that heavily depends on the character of 
the labor market. 
 
If it is assumed that the rich and the poor face the same kind of corruption, than the issue is 
whether corrupt officials are able to price discriminate among the corruptors, i.e. to extort the 
bribe according to the ability to pay the bribe. If there is perfect price discrimination, than 
such a corruption will not generate any change of inequality. Deviation from the perfect price 
discrimination in either direction will change inequality also in either direction. Obviously, 
there are some problems in theoretical explanation of the link between corruption and 
inequality.   
    
In econometric testing Gupta et al. (2002) assumed that corruption is a factor of inequality, 
they implicitly acknowledged a reverse causation by introducing instrumental variable in 
econometric estimations of the impact of corruption to inequality. Cross section estimates of 
multiple independent variables on Gini coefficient based on the 37 countries sample 
demonstrated that OLS estimates of the corruption parameter are either significant or not, 
depending on the specification, while all IV estimates are statistically significant.  
 
Econometric testing of the hypothesis that corruption is a factor of inequality in African 
countries done by Gyimah-Brempong (2002) provides some empirical evidence to support 
the hypothesis. The OLS estimations were statistically significant, though introduction of the 
IV proved not be so successful, as only in one case statistically significant estimation of the 
corruption parameters was recorded, demonstrating that the results are not econometrically 
robust.    
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There is little theoretical support for the hypothesis that corruption increases inequality and 
empirical evidence is somewhat more convincing. Nonetheless, much more challenging is the 
issue of inequality as a factor of corruption. 
 
III Inequality as a Factor of Corruption  
 
The first contribution that has considered inequality as a factor of corruption (Alam 1997) is 
focused to “countervailing actions” as important factor of corruption. The bigger possibility 
for these actions by the victim of corruption (either via evasive, direct and illicit 
countervailing actions), the smaller incidence of corruption. Alam (1997) specifies that the 
ability of the victims of corruption to be engaged in direct countervailing actions will depend 
on their income, as more actions will be taken with higher level of income of the losers and 
on that ground concludes that income distribution is a factor of corruption, implicitly 
assuming that increased inequality generates more corruption. Nonetheless, there is a 
problem in this reasoning, because the level of inequality does not provide any information 
on income level, both absolute income level and the income level relative to the resources 
needed for countervailing action. If average income level is high enough, even high level in 
inequality will not prevent people from countervailing action, i.e. even relatively poor people 
will have enough income for such an action, resulting in low incidence of corruption. 
Contrary to that, if the average level of income is low, even rather equal distribution (low 
values of Gini) will prevent people from countervailing actions, i.e. even relatively rich 
people in poor society will not have enough income for such an action, resulting in high 
incidence of corruption. Accordingly, this theoretical explanation of inequality as a factor of 
corruption is not convincing. 
 
Husted (1999) assumes that there are mutual causation between inequality and corruption; 
nonetheless the focus of this contribution is to inequality as a factor of corruption, following 
rather implausible explanation that less inequality reflects the existence of middle class that 
is, following Scott (1997), considered as a barrier against corruption.6 This hypothesis of 
                                                 
6 The explanation is given that the middle class can act to protect its interest through the organization of interest 
groups and it is assumed that such groups weaken particularistic demands (which tend to promote corruption). 
Of course the assumption about negative correlation between the strength of interest groups and the intensity of 
particularistic demands is not plausible, simply because the very rationale for interest groups emerge is 
promotion of the particularistic interest of the group members.  
 5
inequality as a factor of corruption has been tested on the sample of 44 countries using 
multiple regression models: no statistically significant results have been recorded.   
 
The analysis of relation between gender and corruption (Swamy et al. 2001) that is focused to 
empirical research without any theoretical ground for the hypothesis that women are less 
involved in bribery and are less likely to condone bribe-taking. The gender parameter proved 
to be statistically significant and the authors report that including Gini coefficient in the 
equitation does not reduce significance of the gender parameter, implicitly assuming that 
inequality is factor of corruption (no report on the econometric results of the Gini parameter). 
No theoretical explanation has been provided whatsoever.  
 
Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002) formulated a model focused to the impact of inequality on 
corruption that is based on the development of the theory of alternative allocation of human 
capital (talent and/or entrepreneurship) among productive and rent-seeking (distributive) 
activities (including corruption) following seminal contribution of Baumol (1990) and 
contributions of Murphy et al. (1991), Acemoglu (1995), and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998). 
Following these contributions it is assumed that a decision to which of these two sectors 
human capital will be allocated depends on the expected relative returns. Dabla-Norris and 
Wade (2002) assumes that there are substantial barriers of entry into rent-seeking activities 
(nonconvexities) that must be overcome for such allocation.7 Taking that into account initial 
wealth distribution is important, because only wealthy can afford entry in to the rent-seeking 
world with higher returns than a productive one. Actually following early definition of 
barriers to entry, it is exactly these barriers that enable preservation of excessive (above 
normal) returns. The finding are based on the assumption that there is no financial mediation, 
i.e. that the poor cannot borrow money to invest in the entry in the rent seeking activates. 
Even if there is some financial mediation, credit markets in the countries with excessive rent 
seeking sector are typically characterize by high collateral requirements, much easier met by 
the wealthy then by the poor. Although this model is formulated to demonstrate impact of 
inequality to corruption, it vividly demonstrated reversed causation and vicious circle with 
high incidence and profitability of rent-seeking.    
 
                                                 
7 Such a barrier of entry is, for example, widely reported (Rose-Ackerman, 1999) lump sum illegal payment 
made to the senior civil servants as an entry fee for the civil service that enables appropriation of substantial 
rents due to the rent seeking (corruption).  
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Hellman and Kaufman (2002) addressed the issue of the inequality by introducing the 
concept of crony bias as the symptom of inequality of influence, assuming that rich are able 
to convert their greater wealth into greater political influence over both the formation and 
functioning of institutions. Nonetheless, the very concept of crony bias is not quite clear, 
particularly not the causation: whether rich are able to get political influence because they are 
rich, or whether they are rich because they have obtained political influence. As to the 
measuring, crony bias is specified as the influence to “national laws, rules and regulations”, 
hence typical “state capture” concept, measured through perception of business people – 
there was no measurement of administrative corruption. Empirical findings (statistically 
significant estimates) that the bigger crony bias, the greater tax evasion and corruption have 
not been explained in terms of causation. Finally, the very notion of inequality of influence is 
considering inequality of the firms, not inequality of the population in general. Although both 
inequality and corruption have been mentioned in this contribution, no casualty has been 
established among them.  
 
Far more important is the contribution of Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), a journey into 
American economic history, aimed at explaining the rise of the regulatory state in the US. It 
was demonstrated that in the era of robber barons, rich managed to undermine institutions, 
primary via judicial corruption, resulting in poor protection of the property rights of poor. An 
important innovation made by this contribution was implicit introduction of the concept of 
competition in bribery in the case of judicial corruption. The point is that rich defendants 
managed to bribe the judges involved in tort litigations started by poor plaintiffs, mostly in 
the cases of the customers vs. railways barons. Because of economic inequality, and 
consequent relative income limitations of the plaintiffs, there was no room for any short-term 
countervailing action, resulting in biased judgments, protection of private property rights of 
the rich and violation of the property rights of the poor, consequently increasing inequality. 
There are two important finding of this analysis. The first one is the vicious circle: inequality 
increases corruption and as a result there is increased economic inequality. The second one is 
that, facing the prospect that they cannot win litigation (within a common law legal 
framework), the poor managed to organize influence group that produce political pressure to 
Capitol Hill for producing national statutory legislation that will protect property right of 
these that cannot secure their property right via torts, i.e. within common law based judiciary. 
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It is concluded that judicial corruption (partly generated due to inequality) is to be blamed for 
the rise of the regulatory state in the US.8    
 
Gleaser et al. (2003) went even furthered and formulated a formal model of judicial 
corruption, as the special case of subversion of the institutions by the wealthy and 
consequently political powerful for their own benefit. Nonetheless, the authors assume that 
causation between inequality and injustice (due to the judicial corruption) runs in both 
directions. Initial inequality leads to subversion of institutions, but weak institutions 
themselves allow only those able to protect themselves to become rich. Analyzing British and 
American history within this model, it is concluded that strong institutions that are not 
subverted are the prerequisite of emerge of the middle class.  Finally, econometric estimate of 
the simple cross-section model in which GDP growth is explained by inequality (Gini) and 
rule of law (dummy variable), rendered statistically significant estimated of the parameters 
with expected sign. The conclusion is that inequality is bad for growth only in countries with 
poor rule of law (weak institutions).9  
 
Sonin (2003) developed a formal model of institutional choice in which the rich may favor 
poor protection of the public protection of property rights, i.e. preferring private protection of 
their property rights and undermining property rights of the others, via, among other things. It 
was demonstrated ion the model, based on the experience of activities of Russian tycoons that 
increased economic inequality can create incentives to the rich for using corruption for 
alternative way of protecting their property rights.  
   
Decker et al. (2005) used the finding of the previous model to develop strategy for 
developing rule of law in countries with its deficit. It is assumed that justice systems that are 
incomprehensible, remote, unaffordable, delayed and unfair, effectively deny legal protection 
to ordinary people – rule of law assumes that all people enjoy equal legal protection. 
Although this paper contributed very little to understanding relations between inequality and 
                                                 
8 Statutory legislation, i.e. „regulatory state“ is considered by many (Rubin, 1977, Priest, 1977, and Manne, 
1997 among many) inferior to common law litigations with respect to the protection of property rights. 
Accordingly, regulatory state (statutory legislation that regulates economic activities) can be considered as a 
second best solution.  
9 The obvious paradox of this finding is the XIX century United States. There was a weak rule of law at that 
time (according to the authors themselves) and inequalities were rather considerable. Yet, there was a substantial 
economic growth of the country in that period.   
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corruption, it emphasized the importance of equal legal protection, a very important concept 
of equality that substantially differs from Gini measured economic inequality.     
 
The aim of Uslaner (2005) was to develop a model that will explain how inequality generates 
corruption. The author assumes that there is a direct relation between inequality, that reduces 
a generalized trust in a society, and then the lack of the generalized trust generates corruption. 
Nonetheless, it is not explained how these relations are established, i.e. what is the 
mechanism of that causation. Furthermore, since according to the author decline in the 
general trust increases a particularized trust (for example, mutual trust only within poor and 
within rich), one could conclude that increased inequality in society leads to increased 
corruption only in transaction between rich and poor, decreasing corruption in transactions 
among these groups members. Accordingly, increase of inequality is not sufficient for 
increase in the overall corruption incidence in society; it depends on relative change of inter-
group corruption relative to the intra-group one.    
 
You and Khagram (2005) concluded that inequality increases the level of corruption through 
material and normative mechanisms. Material mechanism is explained by claiming that rich 
have both greater motivation and more opportunity to engage in corruption, whereas the poor 
are more vulnerable to extortion and less able to hold the rich accountable as inequality 
increases.10 Normative mechanism is explained as increase in inequality adversely affects 
social norms about corruption and people’s beliefs about the legitimacy of rules and 
institutions.11 Finally, the authors claim they have found empirical evidence on statistically 
significant interaction between corruption and economic inequality, pointing out to inverse 
causality that creates vicious circle. 
 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) developed a model based on the Meltzer-Richard’s rational 
theory of the size of government (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The Alesina-Angeletos’ model 
is definitely one of the most important contributions to the field of explanation relations 
                                                 
10 This line of reasoning is not quite convincing. As inequality growths, rich are more confident and their 
influence and returns increases, there is no need for them to be involved in corruption. They have already 
shaped the institutions in their way and their property rights are protected. On the contrary, it is the poor who 
have incentives to corrupt – the issue is what their constraints are.    
11 This reasoning is based on the assumption of voluntary compliance with the rules. Nonetheless, modern 
societies are based on the compulsory compliance that is much more efficient and sustainable. This compliance 
is provided by sanction and respective deterrent. It is important to notice that apart from legal sanctions, there 
are also moral sanctions that can provide substantial deterrent in traditional societies.  
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between inequality and corruption. The model is based on the claim that bigger government 
raise the possibilities for corruption and more corruption may in turn raise the support for 
redistributive possibilities that indented to correct the inequality and injustice generated by 
corruption.  The finding of the model is that redistributive and regulatory policies intended to 
reduce inequality may bring about even more opportunities for corruption. Accordingly, 
inequality is not a direct factor of corruption, but it influence flows through demand for 
redistribution (detailed analyzed in Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), supply of redistribution via 
increase government intervention (size of the government) and the increased government 
intervention increase corruption. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) identify a policy dilemma: a 
small government that does not correct market generated inequalities or a large government 
that increases corruption and rent-seeking.12 Nonetheless, it is a question whether this is a 
dilemma at all. As the authors have suggested public spending toward the poor is often mis-
targeted and creates corruption and misallocation. Finally, the authors’ statement that 
willingness to accommodate some corruption in the present may lead to the vicious circle 
where high levels of government intervention due to the market failures and corruption are 
self-sustained. Taking that into account, there is no dilemma from the welfare change aspect. 
Whether this will be a point of view of policy makers is another question altogether.  
 
IV The Assumptions of the Model of Inequality and Judicial Corruption 
 
There have been only few contributions on the topic of judicial corruption: Buscaglia and 
Ulen (1997), Buscaglia and Dakolis (1999), Buscaglia (2001a), Buscaglia (2001b) and Dal 
Bo et al. (2002), but only model by Glaeser et al. (2003) is focused to the issue of inequality 
that is both the origin of judicial corruption (powerful/rich individual’s subversion of the 
judicial institutions) and the consequence of it (biased judicial institutions protects only 
powerful/rich). Begovic (2005) developed a general theoretical model of judicial corruption 
that will be used for modeling relations between inequality and corruption. 
 
The theoretical model of inequality and judicial corruption is based on modeling litigation. In 
most litigation plaintiff and defendant dispute over the endowment and violation of the 
property rights and contract enforcement. The model of judicial corruption is based on the 
following assumptions:  
                                                 
12 This approach to the corruption issues (marker failure vs. government failure) has already been applied by 
Acemoglu (1995). 
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(a) There are two litigants (i = 1, 2) and there are only two outcomes of the 
litigation: one entirely in favor of the plaintiff and the other entirely in favor of 
defendant.  
(b) Any outcome of the litigation does not change the total welfare, just 
redistributes the given total welfare. Accordingly, winning the litigation for 
the plaintiff i generates income Ri, and losing the case generates no income.  
(c) Winning the litigation for the defendant i generates no income loss, and losing 
the case generates income loss Ri.  
(d) Parties that bribe judicial officials are doing that for no other reason than 
winning the litigation.  
(e) There are no moral constraints to activities of any party in the model.  
(f) All parties (agents) behave rationally, i.e., all of them maximize their utility.  
(g)  Corruption is a crime and there is a criminal liability and sanction for 
accepting the bribe (f) as well as criminal sanction for bribing a judicial 
official (k), and it is assumed that always f > 0 and k > 0.  
(h) The probability of the detection of crime of corruption (p) and the probability 
of apprehension and conviction of the corruptor/corrupted are identical and 
that probability is always bigger that zero (0 < p ≤ 1). The probability of 
apprehension/conviction is the same for all the parties in the model.  
(i) Judicial corruption is completely centralized and the judge is the only judicial 
official that can be corrupted.  
(j) There is no appeal of the judgment of the first instance courts. 
(k) Corruptor i who has paid the bribe receives corruption service, i.e. wins the 
litigation with the probability qi, taking into account that 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1. 
(l) All parties in the model are risk neutral.   
(m) There is a budgetary constraint of both litigants regarding bribing. The total 
income of litigant i is yi = bi + ci, where yi stands for total income of the 
litigant i, ci stands for the expenditures of litigant i for purchasing a composite 
subsistence good, and bi is the maximum segment of income that can be used 
for bribing the judge (budgetary constraint for bribing).     
 
Assumption (a) that there are only two outcomes of the litigation (one entirely in favor of the 
plaintiff and the other entirely in favor of defendant) is a simplification of reality as there is 
room for a wider range of the litigation outcomes. According to assumption (b) both parties 
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bribe (if it is decided to bribe) judicial officials only in order to ensure an outcome of the 
litigation in their favor. This contradicts empirical findings (Begovic et al., 2004) that a 
substantial part of the corruption of the judiciary, particularly in the case of litigation is 
focused to delaying the case and postponing an unfavorable outcome. These motives of 
corruptors are ignored in the model to keep it simple.  
 
Punishment for accepting the bribe (f) represents a monetary equivalent of the non-monetary 
punishment (prison, for example) and it also includes all forgone revenues due to the 
punishment. For example, it includes the present value of forgone revenues due to corruption 
(received bribes) and the present value of the difference of the legal incomes that is forgone 
due to expulsion from office, following the model of Stigler and Becker (1974).   
 
According to assumption (i), there is completely centralized judicial corruption, i.e., it is 
sufficient to bribe only one judicial official to get the corruption service. This is not to 
assume that the service will certainly be delivered, but to assume that bribing of the 
additional judicial official will not increase the probability of delivering that service. For 
simplicity of the model it is assumed that judges are the only judicial officials that can be 
bribed. This assumption only facilitates the formulation of the model while departure from it 
(introducing the assumption that all judicial officials are subject to corruption) does not affect 
the model’s results. Finally, this assumption should not be taken to imply that only judges, of 
all judicial officials, are prone to corruption. 
  
Assumption (j) on no appeal possibility from the first instance courts judgments violates 
reality and it is introduced for simplicity of the model. Introducing second or more court 
instances provides for many possible strategies of the corruptors and leads toward 
counterproductive complication of the model.  
 
According to assumption (k) there is room for an illegal corruption contract not to be 
enforced, i.e., that the corruptor receives no corruption services after he/she paid the bribe. 
Effectively, an assumption on opportunistic behavior of corrupted judge is introduced. 
Consequently it is the expected values of the monetary expressions of a favorable litigation 
outcome that are taken into account, i.e., all decisions regarding judicial corruption are 
subject to uncertainty.   
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Finally, bribery budgetary constraint of the litigants depends on inequality. If there is no 
inequality (Gini = 0), then: 
 
21 yy =           (1) 
 
and assuming that the consumption of the composite subsistence good is the same for both 
litigants, it follows that:  
 
.21 bb =           (2) 
 
The introduction of inequality is based on the assumption that litigant i = 1 is in better 
position than litigant i = 2. Formally: 
 
,0;)(;21 >∂
∂=+=
Gini
Ginifbb βββ      (3) 
 
meaning that increase in inequality decreases relative bribery budgetary constraint of the 
better off litigant.   
 
V Formulation of the Model 
 
The key difference between judicial corruption and corruption in the most of the other 
branches of government lies in the fact that in the judiciary there are incentives for both 
parties (litigants) to corrupt the judicial official (judge) to secure a favorable outcome. In 
other words, two potential corruptors appear with conflicting requirements. In contrast, in 
corruption outside the judiciary, i.e., in the majority of other areas of state administration, 
there is in most of the cases only one potential corruptor. For example, with corruption in the 
customs administration only one importer is in position to bribe a customs officer to calculate 
a lower customs rate for a given delivery of goods.13  
                                                 
13 No doubt that judicial corruption is not the only case of administrative corruption in which two or more 
competing corruptors are active. The most similar case of administrative corruption is the case of public 
procurements and privatization of the firms via selling the capital. However, it the case of the “state capture”, 
i.e. adopting the rules of the game that are favorable for the corruptor, it is reasonable to assume that, in 
principle, there are at least two concerned parties (more than one corruptor), as there are more than one 
individual and/or group interest in society.  
 13
 Since there are two parties in cases of judicial corruption, i.e., two players on the supply side 
of the bribe (or on the demand side for corruption service), their inter-relation regarding the 
decision making on corruption should be examined. The question is, to use the terminology 
of game theory, whether this game is cooperative, i.e., whether two participants cooperate in 
the decision-making process. Clearly no cooperation exists in this case and consequently 
judicial corruption is a non-cooperative game. If there had been cooperation or the possibility 
of two sides coming to an agreement, they would not have been in court, but would have 
already agreed on the dispute which, precisely due to their non-cooperation, has become 
litigation. If they had been able to cooperate, they would not have been involved in the 
litigation, but would have resolved the dispute in an agreement or out-of-court settlement. 
This lack of cooperation means that both sides make decisions exclusively by anticipating 
their rival's actions. 
 
The next important question is (still using the terminology of game theory): is this a multi-
period game, i.e., a repeated game? If it is a multi-period game, each player will have to pay 
attention to the reactions of the other party in the next stage of the game. Litigation in this 
model, according to the assumption (j) that there is no possibility for appeals of the judgment 
of the court of first instance, is not a repeated game. The same pair of litigants does not 
appear before the court of first instance again in the same case. Therefore the following 
theoretical model of judicial corruption can be described as a single-period non-cooperative 
game, or, in microeconomic terminology, a static non-cooperative duopoly.  
 
What are the incentives for a potential corruptor when deciding to bribe the judge and how 
much to offer? If the probability of an unbiased litigation outcome in favor of one party is 
0.50, according to the assumption (c), and if the judge agrees to offer a corruption service 
exclusively to the litigant who has paid the higher bribe, the potential corruptor will be ready 
to offer an amount which is slightly higher than that offered by his opponent. In other words, 
it is the relative amount of bribe that is important for the judge when deciding the litigation – 
the higher amount of the bribe offered by one party produces a judgment in his/her favor, 
independently of the absolute amount of the bribe. In this process neither of the two litigants 
knows how much their opponent will offer, but for any amount of bribe offered by the 
opponent, the observed potential corruptor will offer slightly more. In other words, for a set 
of the amounts of a bribe offered by one litigant, a best-response (reaction) function from the 
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other litigant can be formulated. In this way a version of model of static non-cooperative 
duopoly is constructed.  
 
How is the equilibrium established in the model? To answer this question it is necessary to 
formulate a curve of responses for both litigants, to specify the minimum amount of the bribe 
that the judge is ready to accept and the maximum amount of bribe that potential corruptors 
are ready to offer.  
 
The best-response curve of both parties is described by the best response function that 
depends only on, in analogy with standard static models of non-cooperative duopolies, the 
amount of the bribe offered by the other party (rival). Consequently:  
 
( )211 BRB =           (4) 
 
( )122 BRB =           (5) 
 
whereby BB1 and B2  B are the amounts of bribe that litigants i =1 and i = 2 are ready to offer/pay. 
Since each corruptor is motivated to offer a bribe somewhat higher than that offered by the 
competitor assuming that both competitors behave in the same manner, response curves of 
both competitors can be formulated: 
 
ε+= 21 RB           (6) 
 
ε+= 12 RB           (7) 
 
whereby ε  stands for any small positive number.  
 
The minimum amount of the bribe accepted by a judge, i.e., the minimum amount of the 
bribe for which a corrupted judge will render a service (a favorable judgment), can be 
specified on the basis of the finding of Becker's model of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968).  
The minimum, i.e., the amount of bribe B on the margin (the amount to which a judge is 
indifferent) is the amount which provides the judge with expected zero utility from the 
possible corruption transaction, as described by the following equation:  
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 .0)()1()()( =−+−= BUpfBpUUE       (8) 
 
whereby U stands for utility function, B stands for the amount of bribe, i.e., total revenue 
generated from committing the crime of corruption, f stands for monetary equivalent of the 
punishment for the crime of corruption (the amount of money that offender is prepared to pay 
for avoiding the punishment)14, and p stands for the detection of the crime of corruption in 
the form of accepting the bribe, i.e., the probability of apprehension and conviction of the 
culprit. Naturally, the concrete value of the minimum amount of the bribe depends on the 
concrete shape and parameters of the function of utility of the judge. Since all the domains of 
the function (8) are monetary variables or monetary equivalents of some other variables, it is 
apparent that it is the case of utility function of money. If constant marginal utility of money 
is assumed and following the application of Becker’s model for wages of civil servants as 
barrier for corruption (Becker and Stigler, 1974), condition (8) can be reformulated as:15  
 
.0)1()( =−+− BpfBp         (9) 
 
Solving (6) by B permits calculation of the minimum amount of bribe (B*) that should be paid 
for delivering the corruption service, i.e., a favorable litigation outcome:  
 
.* fpB =           (10) 
 
The maximum amount of the bribe which can be offered by corruptors, according to the 
findings of Becker's model, depends on the expected utility from winning the litigation and 
the total costs incurred by the corruptor. The maximum amount of the bribe, i.e., the amount 
of the bribe on the margin, that the corruptor is ready to offer is the one which equates the 
expected utility stemming from the decision not to corrupt the judge (allowing the litigation 
to follow its course) and the expected utility stemming from corrupting the judge, as is 
described by the following equation: 
                                                 
14 This monetary value also includes forgone revenues (utility) that are consequence of the enforcement of the 
punishment. Implicit assumption of condition (8) is that judge obtains no utility from doing “the right things”. 
This is one of the differences between this model and the one of Glaeser et al. (2003). If it is, following Posner 
(1995), assumed that judge obtains utility from “doing the right thing”, left hand side of the equation should 
equal that expected utility.  
15 Furthermore, assumption on constant marginal utility of money is consistent with assumption (l) that all 
parties are risk-neutral. 
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 ( ) ( )[ ] [ ])()1( iiiiiiiiiii TBRqUpkTBpURU +−−+++−=α ,             (11) 
 
whereby i = 1, 2.  In equation (11), αi stands for probability of winning the litigation without 
corruption (both sides refrain from corruption), Ri stands for the revenue/loss due to the 
won/lost litigation, Ui stands for utility function, BB
]
i stands for the amount of bribe litigant i is 
ready to pay, k stands for the monetary equivalent of the punishment for the crime of 
corruption by bribing judicial officials (the amount of money the culprit is ready to pay to 
avoid the punishment,  p stands for the probability of detection of corruption and 
apprehension of the culprit who bribed the officials,  Ti stands for transaction costs, and qi 
stands for the probability of winning the litigation as the result of bribing the judge.    16
 
The condition (11) includes the corruptor's total costs – in addition to the amount of the bribe 
itself, transaction costs (Ti) are taken into account irrespectively of whether the bribery was 
successful or not. The difference between this model and Becker’s one lies in the assumption 
that in case of detection, the litigation judgment becomes null and void, so the corruptor is 
not able to enjoy the utility from winning the litigation by corruption. Furthermore, unlike 
Becker's model, it is assumed that there is no certainty of gaining utility from a corruption 
service, since there is no certainty that the service will be provided. In other words, instead of 
total value, the equation introduces the expected utility resulting from the corruption and a 
corruption based outcome (for each qi < 1).     
 
Accepting the assumption on constant marginal utility of money, equation (11) can be 
transformed into:   
 
( )[ ] [ .)()1( iiiiiiii TBRqpkTBpR +−−+++−=α      (12) 
 
                                                 
16 The term transaction costs in this paper is referring only to the transaction costs of judicial corruption. 
Consequently, legal transaction costs of litigation, i.e. legal expenditures of the litigants are not taken into 
account. These costs are important variable for explaining decision to sue, i.e. to start litigation, and during the 
litigation these costs are crucial for decision to settle instead to going to the trial (Kaplow and Shavell, 2002)). 
These legal expenditures must be borne by litigants one way or the other (under American or English rule), 
irrespectively whether they decide to bribe the judge or not, hence these costs/expenditures are omitted from the 
model.  
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hence the maximum amount of the bribe (B**i) that the corruptor i is ready to pay is the one 
that fulfills the condition (12).  By solving equation (12), BBi, the maximum amount of the 
bribe corruptor i is ready to pay is established: 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] ,)1(
)1()1(**
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
>−−−−
<−−−−−−−−=
iiiiii
iiiiiiiii
i bTkpRqpifb
bTkpRqpifTkpRqp
B α
αα
  (13) 
 
emphasizing that the maximum amount of bribe corruptor i is ready to pay should be within 
his bribery budgetary constraint.  
 
 The mechanism for establishing equilibrium in this model can be described graphically 
(Figure 1). The line with a 45 degree angle with the origin represents a set of points 
describing the situation in which equal amounts of bribe are offered/paid by both litigants 
(isocorruptive curve). Initially, both litigants are motivated to depart from the curve of equal 
bribes and to offer a bribe which is slightly higher (ε) than the bribe offered by the other 
party, thus attempting to win a litigation by bribe. To the offer of an increased bribe, or its 
anticipation, the other party responds by increasing his/her offer again, to a level slightly 
higher than the former party’s. In this manner the response curves of both parties are formed 
a little to the left and a little to the right from the equal bribe curve. Hence, the model clearly 
represents a non-cooperative oligopoly (duopoly) with a convergence of reaction curves from 
both litigants and the Bertrand equilibrium is established. However, the question arises, what 
is the value of the equilibrium; in other words, when does the competition of the two 
interested parties stop, bearing in mind that they have no incentive to change their behavior. 
In the Bertrand model, that is based on price competition, the equilibrium is established when 
prices equal marginal costs, since none of the competitors is motivated to decrease the sale 
price below the marginal costs. Analogous to this, equilibrium in this model of judicial 
corruption is established when the competition of two competing corruptors reaches the stage 
where the offered amount of bribe equals the maximum amount of bribe that the corruptors, 
on the basis of the limitation described by equation (7), are ready to pay (point E, Figure 1).  
In other words, the equilibrium amount of the bribe in this model equals the maximum 
amount of bribe that the corruptors are ready to pay.  
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The features of the equilibrium are very interesting. First, this equilibrium is Pareto 
inefficient, from the corruptors’ viewpoint. The mechanism of Bertrand competition in 
duopoly leads to an equilibrium which can be established only with the maximum possible 
amount of the bribe. However, the same outcome for corruptors can be achieved (any point 
on the same bribe line below the equilibrium point) with a lower absolute amount of the 
bribe. In other words, the same outcome will be reached with lower costs for both corruptors 
– the only important thing is that the amount is higher than the minimum amount of bribe 
acceptable to the judge. This result corresponds to the result of Becker's model of competition 
between interest groups for political influence (Becker, 1983). Although Becker's model 
generates a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, there is no difference regarding the efficiency of 
allocation of resources in corruption or in organized political pressure.  
 
 19
Figure I 
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B* 
B* BB1** BB1 
 
The second finding of the model is that in bribing equilibrium a litigation the outcome is the 
same as that in which no one bribes the judge (no corruption at all).  The assumption of the 
model is that in conditions without corruption the probability of a litigation outcome in favor 
of one party is 50%. Under conditions in which the relative corruption pressure of both 
parties on the judge is the same, the probability does not change. This finding is paradoxical – 
at the maximum possible amount of bribe, the only feasible amount at the equilibrium, 
corruption has no effect on the litigation outcome. Furthermore, this finding is completely 
consistent with the previous one, as its special case – the same outcome from the viewpoint 
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of the litigants can be obtained if neither of the parties bribes the judge. If the two parties 
could agree on that and enforce the agreement, the welfare of both parties would increase, 
since there would be no direct (the amount of bribe) and indirect (transaction) costs of 
corruption. This demonstrates that this model of corruption, which belongs to the class of 
Bertrand models, corresponds in its results to the case of the prisoner’s dilemma within the 
framework of game theory.  
 
The previous finding leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium outcome of litigation with 
corruption is not only Pareto inefficient from the perspective of corruptors, but also leads to 
dead-weigh loss of welfare. The point is that, in addition to the amount of the bribe 
transferred from the corruptor to the corrupted, judicial corruption also generates substantial 
transaction costs, i.e., misallocation of real resources, with their opportunity costs. In other 
words, with the described outcome of a litigation which could have been reached without any 
transaction costs, i.e., without bribing the judge, judicial corruption in this model inevitably 
creates dead-weight loss of welfare. Elimination of corruption of the judiciary within this 
model inevitably creates an improvement of allocative efficiency, although it is not a Pareto 
improvement. The point is that elimination of such corruption leads to a decrease in the utility 
(welfare) of the corrupted judges, which violates the Pareto criterion.17  
 
Finally, there is the question of the sustainability of the described equilibrium of this model. 
The question stems from the fact that in the equilibrium the outcome is identical to the 
situation in which neither of the litigants bribes the judge. In other words, there is no 
difference in the probability of winning the litigation with or without corruption.  In such 
conditions, it is interesting to ask what value of probability qi from equation (12) makes that 
maximum amount of the bribe that the corruptor is ready pay, specified by condition (14) lie 
below the minimum amount of the bribe that the judge is ready to accept, specified by 
condition (14), since this is a sufficient condition for the elimination of corruption in the 
model.  
 
Judicial corruption exists if and only if:  
 
                                                 
17 Under assumption on existence of transaction costs of corruption, i.e. if transaction costs are bigger than zero, 
elimination of corruption will definitely be an improvement consistent with Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
(compensation test). If transaction costs are zero, elimination of corruption will be neutral regarding the 
compensation test.  
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,*** iBB <           (14) 
 
for at least one i, which means that a sufficient condition for elimination of judicial 
corruption is:  
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
>−−−−
<−−−−−−−−>
iiiii
iiiiiiii
bTkpRqpifb
bTkpRqpifTkpRqp
fp α
αα
)1(
)1()1(
  (15) 
 
for both i, whose transformation and solution by qi yields (if the maximum bribe level is 
within the bribery budgetary constraints of i litigants):   
 
,
)1()1(
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i
i
i −+−
++< α         (16) 
 
which demonstrates that for a given probability of winning the litigation by bribing the judge  
(qi), increasing the probability of detection and apprehension, increasing the punishment for 
both paying and accepting the bribe, and an increase of the transaction costs increase the 
probability of fulfillment of inequality (16), i.e., the probability of elimination of corruption 
of the judiciary. On the other side, an increase in the value of litigation decreases the 
probability of elimination of corruption of the judiciary.18 If both the left and right sides of 
the inequality (16) are divided by qi, it is demonstrated that corruption will be eliminated if 
the expected value of total costs exceeds the expected value of the gain; an entirely plausible 
result.  
 
If the maximum bribe level equals the bribery budgetary constraints of i litigants, than 
sufficient condition for elimination of judicial corruption is:   
 
ibfp >           (17) 
 
Alternatively, a necessary condition for judicial corruption to exist is:  
                                                 
18 These finding can be used for as elements for policies against judicial corruption. It is evident that increase of 
probability of detection/apprehension and increase in punishment lead toward specific selection of the corrupt 
litigations; only high value litigations can be corrupted judicial cases. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume 
the increase of probability of detection/apprehension leads toward the increase of transaction costs. Hence, 
beside direct, this measure will have an indirect effect.   
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If condition (18) is fulfilled for every i, judicial corruption is eliminated because there is no 
way for the corruptor to offer/pay the amount of bribe that is effective. Hence it is 
demonstrated that, under the conditions specified, i.e., under the specific values of the 
variables in relation (18), equilibrium in the model of judicial corruption is not sustainable 
and elimination of judicial corruption must result. Hence, the question arises, why judicial 
corruption, in cases of litigations, exists nonetheless – at least according to the findings of 
empirical research in various countries.  
 
So it is interesting to see whether this model can achieve an equilibrium in which one of the 
litigants offers/pays a higher bribe than the other. To answer this question one should review 
the implicit assumption about the identical maximum amounts of bribe that both litigants are 
ready to pay, i.e. that the values in equation (13) are identical for both corruptors. This 
assumption holds only for complete equality (Gini coefficient equals zero). The advent and 
increase of inequality introduces and increases probability that the maximum bribe of one 
litigant (the poor one) is constrained by his bribery budgetary constraint, resulting in one 
litigant (the rich one) offering higher bribe than the other.    
 
In this framework one litigant can afford a higher maximum amount of bribe than the other, 
i.e., that the maximum amount of bribe that one litigant is ready to pay is higher than the 
other litigant's maximum, an equilibrium is achieved in which this amount is higher than the 
maximum amount of any bribe of the other litigant. Within this framework, the litigant who 
is ready to offer/pay the larger bribe inevitably wins, and the size of the difference in amounts 
is absolutely irrelevant. Consequently, under such conditions the equilibrium amount of the 
bribe will be as follows: 
 
.**2
**
1 ε+== BBBe          (19) 
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However, the change in the given assumption on the symmetry of competing corruptors 
altered the character of the model itself and the newly-established equilibrium is not a 
Bertrand type of equilibrium, but instead a monopoly equilibrium in which one of the 
competitors with his superior efficiency and lower costs manages to eliminate the opponent 
completely and thus establish a monopoly. In other words, a similar but inevitably alternative 
model of judicial corruption with two asymmetric corruptors is thus formulated. 
 
The crucial question regarding this mechanism of equilibrium is the one about the probability 
that the poor litigant is constrained by its bribery budget. It is reasonable to assume that R, i.e. 
the value of the litigation between rich and poor litigant is rather small, because the value of 
the transaction is small. The bigger inequality, the smaller is value of the 
litigation/transaction. The smaller value of the litigation R, according to the relation (13), the 
smaller probability that bribery budgetary constraint of any side will affect the maximum 
(equilibrium) amount of the bribe one of the litigants is ready to pay. Accordingly, it seems 
that it is not very likely that inequality will bring the difference that will enable a monopoly 
equilibrium to be established.  
 
Apart from inequality, what else brings about the difference between the maximum amounts 
of the bribe that two litigants are ready to pay? Some variables in the relevant equation (13) 
are inevitably identical (the sanctions and probability of apprehension/conviction).19 
However, the difference can appear in the transaction costs of corruption. It is reasonable to 
assume that those more knowledgeable in corruption and/or those with more experience in 
corruption, are more efficient in the implementation of corruption in relation to other 
corruptors – their transaction costs are lower. Since the gap in individual transaction costs is 
the source of difference in the maximum amount of the bribe that corrupting litigants and are 
ready to offer, the one who is more efficient in corruption implementation wins in the 
corruption competition. This demonstrates that there is an incentive to reduce transaction 
costs by specialization and innovation in the sphere of corruption and thus to gain superiority 
over competitors.20 It is very important to notice that the poor can specialize in corruption, 
                                                 
19 One could argue that the probability of convictions of the rich is smaller that the poor due to better legal 
representation in the court. Although reasonable, it seem that effects of that are not significant.    
20 Such a specialization can generate at least another advantage: decreasing the probability of detection of 
corruption and probability of apprehension of the briber. This means violation of the assumption (h) of 
exogenous probability of detection. Decrease in that probability, according to the result (13), makes the increase 
of the maximum amount of bribe that the corruptor is prepared to offer/pay.   
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reducing their transaction costs of corruption and becoming more efficient in these operation 
and that will enable them to win the litigations via corruption.  
 
These findings, especially the one about differences in transaction costs, demonstrates that 
the establishment of equilibrium in the new, modified model of judicial corruption can be 
reduced to a kind of auction mechanism which provides incentives to competitors to reveal 
their transaction costs of corruption, as well as their subjective assessment of the probability 
of the success of the corruption transaction, which means revelation of the real amount of 
bribe they are ready to pay.21  
 
If the maximum amounts of the bribe which corruptors are ready to offer/pay vary, the 
equilibrium is established at an amount higher than the maximum size of the bribe that the 
inferior opponent is ready to pay. This modification leads to an equilibrium outcome resulting 
in a biased judgment favorable to the corruptor-winner to the extent to which the corrupt 
judge enforces the corruption contract, i.e., fulfils the obligations in this contract. Since this 
modification enables a corrupted judgment to occur, the model explains judicial corruption 
and, particularly, its sustainability.  
 
VI Consequences of Judicial Corruption due Inequality 
 
The crucial consequence of the judicial corruption due inequality is undermining property 
rights of the poor. That increases uncertainty and due to higher “requested” returns decreases 
investments of the poor, both in terms of physical and human capital. Accordingly, their 
prosperity relative to the rich is declining, increasing inequality. Furthermore, since judiciary 
should upholds the contracts, judicial corruption in favor of the rich means that transactions 
are not secured by the courts. Consequently that decreases market exchanges and the division 
of labor, since size of the market has long time ago (Stigler, 1951) been identified as one of 
the crucial constraint of that division and the productivity that follows from it. Furthermore, 
this type of judicial corruption, i.e. the one that favors rich provides incentives for poor to 
exchange among themselves, since theses contacts will be uphold by the courts – the rich are 
not interested in them. Such a restriction of trade (exchange) will additionally decrease 
welfare of the poor (comparing with free and unrestricted trade), although that restriction will 
                                                 
21 Other factors that can generate difference between the maximum amounts of the bribe that two litigants are 
ready to pay are described in Begovic (2005).   
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also affect the rich since it will reduce the transactions between the rich and the poor. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the adverse effects to the poor will be relatively 
bigger, increasing inequality.  
 
Additional problem for the poor is necessity of alternative protection of their property rights, 
particularly the rights that are most vulnerable. Alternative protection generates additional 
costs (comparing with the rule of law), reduces welfare of the poor and creates inefficient 
allocation of resources. Some methods of alternative (private) protection of property rights 
are economically very pervasive and creates massive reallocation of resources in to the rent-
seeking activities, decreasing overall economic efficiency and social welfare (Gambetta, 
1993).  
 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), alternative protection of the 
property rights of the poor could be established via regulation, i.e. statutory legislation that 
will explicitly preclude dome actions of all economic agents. Nonetheless, it has already been 
pointed out that such legislation could be a second best solution. 
  
Obviously, there are substantial adverse effects of judicial corruption both in terms of 
reducing economic efficiency and increasing inequality. Hence, the crucial question what 
public policies should be applied for combating judicial corruption. More specifically, is 
compulsory redistribution aimed at decreasing inequality reasonable public policy for 
combating corruption? First of all, inequality is identified as one, far from being the only 
factor of judicial corruption. It was even demonstrated that the poor, with appropriate 
adjustment policies (increasing efficiency due to the specialization in corruption and hence 
decreasing the transactions costs) can turn the corruption in their favor. Furthermore, 
decreasing inequality via compulsory redistribution will only increase total income of the 
poor, relaxing their budgetary constraint and increasing the incidence of corruption. The most 
important policies to combat corruption that are identified in relation (18) have nothing to do 
with inequality. Accordingly, there is no evidence that decreasing inequality will decrease 
judicial corruption.   
 
Furthermore, as it has been pointed out by Alesina and Angeletos (2005), compulsory 
redistribution aimed at decreasing inequality increases size of the government intervention 
and by that the prospects for corruption which in turn (due to the impact of corruption to 
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inequality) increases inequality. Obviously it would be too costly and absolutely 
counterproductive to use decreasing inequality as policy for combating corruption (both 
specific judicial corruption, as well as the overall one).  
  
The crucial policies for combating corruption are those not related to the redistribution. These 
are policies that both directly and indirectly increases the probability of 
apprehension/conviction and the total costs of bribing – not only negative utility stemming 
for the criminal punishment, but also all the opportunity costs of all streams of income 
forgone due to the apprehension, as well as transaction costs of corruption. Strong and 
efficient institutions have beneficial effect to all the mentioned policies.  
 
All these policies are elements of the rule of law as the most important public good that 
government should provide. Accordingly, the government should provide a public good of 
rule of law, not the redistribution. If there is rule of law and strong institutions the prospects 
for decent life are growing and the demand for redistribution is decreasing, hence there will 
be less distribution. Provision of public good is not so vulnerable to special interest politics 
and corruption as redistributive policies. Strong, yet minimal government is the way out from 
vicious circle of inequality, redistribution and corruption  
 
VII Conclusions 
 
A review of recent contributions to the explorations of the relations between economic 
inequality and corruption demonstrated that corruption as a factor of inequality has been 
poorly theoretically explained, although some empirical evidence has been demonstrated. 
More convincing theoretical explanations have been offered regarding inequality as one of 
the factors of corruption. A theoretical model of judicial corruption in which economic 
inequality is one of the factors (explanatory variables) of judicial corruption has been 
formulated. It demonstrated that inequality can be one of the factors leading to the 
equilibrium in which one of the litigants acquires the case by bribing the official, not 
necessarily, even likely the decisive one. The consequences of corruption due to inequality, 
practically the effects to economic inequality are stemming from the inadequate protection of 
the property rights of the poor. Policies to combat judicial corruption should be focused to the 
provision of the public good of the rule of law, increasing both probability of the 
apprehension and the sanctions for the corruption. 
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